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We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain 
future bequest needs. An individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often 
uncertain about the future financial needs of his or her family, in the event of an untimely 
death. Ideally, the individual would like to insure the risk of having high future bequest needs; 
but since bequest motives are typically unverifiable, a contract directly insuring these needs is 
not feasible. We derive two equivalent long-term life insurance contracts that are incentive 
compatible and achieve a higher welfare level than the naïve strategy of delaying the purchase 
of insurance until after one’s bequest needs are known. We also examine the welfare effects 
of such contracts and we show how third-party financial products, although beneficial to the 
individual in the short run, can be welfare decreasing over one’s lifetime. 
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paper. 1 Introduction
People purchase life insurance to protect their dependents against ￿nancial
losses caused by their deaths. In the life insurance market, most contracts
extend many years into the future. Such prevalence of long-term contracts
is partly due to the premium risk or "insurability risk." In particular, a
person￿ s health status may deteriorate, which makes short-term life insurance
no longer a⁄ordable in the future. In the extreme, a person￿ s health could
deteriorate to such an extent that no life insurance is available. A long-
term insurance contract with a front-loaded premium schedule, in a certain
sense, also provides insurance against this "insurability risk." However, even
without such insurability risk, a long-term contract can be bene￿cial. In
particular, we show how such arrangements can improve welfare by partially
insuring the risk of having a high bequest demand in the future.
Although it may be advantageous from an insurability standpoint to
arrange for life insurance early, the need for life insurance many years later
depends on the future demographic structure of the household and may not
be known in advance. The impact of one￿ s death often depends on the ￿-
nancial condition of other family members, as well the future preferences of
these family members, as examined by Lewis (1989). Moreover, as shown by
Bernheim (1991), there is a demand by breadwinners to hold part of their
assets in a solely bequeathable form, as opposed a form that could also be
used for current consumption if one is alive.
Absent any insurability risk, it would at ￿rst appear to be optimal to
purchase life insurance contracts later in life, when bequest needs are better
known. Another possibility is to purchase short-term contracts and to adjust
the insurance level as needed at a later date, as in Polborn et al. (2006). If
the status of one￿ s health is private information, this runs into the problem of
1renewability risk.1 However, even without the insurability risk, a short-term
purchasing strategy for life insurance is not optimal.
Intuitively, although delaying the purchase of life insurance can help indi-
viduals to determine the appropriate level of insurance, in concordance with
their known bequest demand, one must still pay the extra insurance premium
if one￿ s demand turns out to be high. That is, one must plan for the pos-
sibility of needing to spend more on insurance premia in the future. Note
that this form of "premium risk" has nothing to do with the insurability risk.
Here the risk is on the budget required to ￿nance the required amount of life
insurance; not on whether or not the premium rate is higher.
In this paper, we consider the design of a long-term life insurance contract
that also can help to mitigate the risk of possibly having a high bequest need
in the future. Our model is similar to that of Polborn et al. (2006), except
that we do not consider the insurability risk. With no insurability risk,
but with a risk of demand type, the insurance premium per unit of coverage
should not change for short-term contracts. Hence one can always buy more
life insurance later at the same price. Polborn et. al. (2006) also mention the
case with no insurability risk, but they conclude that there is no bene￿t to
purchasing insurance earlier, since they require zero-pro￿t insurance pricing
within each period.2
However, a long-term contract can also help to mitigate the risk of bequest
type. Although this risk introduces no price risk per se, it does require that
individuals with a high-bequest demand spend a higher share of their wealth
on life insurance. Thus, a high-bequest demand leads to less consumption
1See Pauly et al. (1995). However, if this change in insurability is observable, it
might be possible, at least in theory, to insure it directly in a manner similar to Cochrane
(1995). For commitment problems associated with long-term contracting when changes
in insurability are unobservable risk see Hendel and Lizzeri (2003).
2Sheshinski (2007) derives similar results in model with annutities, rather than life
insurance.
2than a low-bequest demand, if an individual does not die early. We show
long-term contracts can partially hedge this future consumption risk. This is
accomplished by e⁄ectively transferring some wealth in future states where
one￿ s bequest needs are low to states for which bequest needs are higher.
Since bequest needs are not likely to be easily veri￿able, the contract cannot
just pay a transfer to anyone who claims to have high bequests needs. Hence,
the long-term contract is written with particular options, and the exercise of
these options occurs via self selection. Long-term contracting also allows for
any zero-pro￿t condition to be implemented over the duration of the contract,
rather than within each time period.
In the next section, we set up the basic model. We then examine a
￿rst-best world in which bequest type is veri￿able. We examine the optimal
insurance contract, which also provides protection again the risk of having
a high bequest need in this setting. Next, we derive two equivalent long-
term life insurance contracts for the case where bequest type is unveri￿able.
These contracts are incentive compatible and achieve a higher welfare level
than the na￿ve strategy of delaying the purchase of insurance until after one￿ s
bequest needs are known. These second-best contracts are also compared to
the ￿rst-best case. We conclude by explaining how some relatively new third
party ￿nancial products, especially so-called "life settlement" contracts, can
upset this long-term contract arrangement.
2 The Model
We develop a simple three-period model of life-insurance purchases when
individuals are uncertain about their bequest preferences. A person with
initial wealth w0 at date t = 0 learns of his preferences for bequest at date
t = 1. The individual faces a probability q of death at date t = 2. With
probability 1 ￿ q, the individual lives to consume another period. To keep
3the model simple and to focus on bequest needs, q is non-random and, thus,
there is no insurability risk. For similar reasons, we further assume that the
interest rate for borrowing or lending is zero.
Denote by wd and wl the individual￿ s ￿nal wealth in the states of death
and survival respectively. Let i refer to the individual￿ s type with respect to
preferences for bequest at t = 1. The expected utility of ￿nal wealth is then
qvi(w
d) + (1 ￿ q)u(w
l);
where vi(wd) is the utility of leaving wealth wd to dependents at t = 2 and
u(wl) is the utility of wealth wl in the state of living. Both functions are
increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, v0
i(w) > u0(w) for all w, implying
a demand for life insurance. Taken together, vi(wd) and u(wl) can be viewed
as a state-dependent value function for the utility derived from the optimal
consumption and savings strategies, given the individual￿ s wealth in each
state at the beginning of date t = 2 and taking implicitly into account the
future labor income that a surviving individual would earn.3
Bequest needs are initially uncertain. At t = 0, the individual does not
know his bequest utility function, which can be either vB(￿) with probability
￿ or vA(￿) with probability 1 ￿ ￿. We assume that v0
B(w) > v0
A(w) for
all w, so that type B is the high-bequest type. An individual￿ s type, once
learned, is private information, but insurers know the proportion of types in
the population. Any amount of life insurance coverage can be purchased
at any time before t = 2. Let L be the death bene￿t purchased.4 The life
3In this setting, we can view w0 as the present value of lifetime earnings for this person,
whom for simplicity we will consider as the sole "bread winner" for the family. If the
person dies, then family lifetime income will become less. The state-dependent utility v
captures this income loss. Obviously, we are simplifying the basic insurance decision to a
great extent. For example, we do not consider that future income might be risky, nor do
we consider intermediate consumption. See, for example, Campbell (1980). For a survey
of many of these theoretical life insurance issues, see Villeneuve (2000).
4We ignore any savings component built into many life insurance contracts. In this
4insurance premium is assumed to be actuarially fair, so the premium for the
amount of coverage L is qL.
As a preliminary step, we examine an individual￿ s demand for life insur-
ance when coverage is purchased at t = 1, after the individual has learned
his type. We then show that, from the perspective of t = 0, the individual
would like to insure against the risk of being a high-bequest type. However,
insurance against such a risk cannot be bought directly, since one￿ s type is
unveri￿able.
3 Bequest type is veri￿able
Here we consider two insurance strategies. The ￿rst is simply to wait until
bequest type is known before buying insurance. Even in a world with no
insurability risk, the individual has a risk as to how much the total expendi-
ture on insurance will be. In an ideal world, where bequest type is veri￿able,
this risk can be insured.
The na￿ve strategy
The simplest strategy for buying life insurance is to wait until t = 1 and to
purchase coverage after learning one￿ s type. It is useful to characterize the
demand for coverage as a function of some arbitrary wealth w at date t = 1.
Obviously, if nothing has been done before this date, then w = w0.
For an individual with bequest type i and wealth w at date t = 1, the
life-insurance objective is to
max
Li
qvi(w ￿ qLi + Li) + (1 ￿ q)u(w ￿ qLi); i = A;B:
sense, we can regard L as the pure death-protection bene￿t that is paid in the event of an
early death at date t = 2. More simply, we can view the insurance as a type of term life
insurance product that only pays a bene￿t if death is at date t = 2.
5The optimal coverage L￿










i(w)) = 0; i = A;B: (1)
Risk aversion ensures that the second-order condition is satis￿ed. It is easily
checked that L￿
B(w) > L￿
A(w), i.e., B is indeed the high-bequest type.
Substituting for the optimal amount of coverage yields the date 1 optimal
expected utility




i(w)) + (1 ￿ q)u(w ￿ qL
￿
i(w)); i = A;B:
Here Vi(w) is the value function for a person of type i at date t = 1, who has
wealth w at that date. Viewed from date t = 0 and treating bequest type as
a random variable, Vi(w) is a state-dependent utility function exhibiting risk
aversion in each state of the world. To see this, apply the envelope theorem
and use (1) to obtain
V
0
i (w) = u
0(w ￿ qL
￿
i(w)); i = A;B: (2)
Since L￿
B(w) > L￿
A(w), it follows that V 0










i (w)) < 0:







i + qu00 > 0; (3)
where the expression is obtained by total di⁄erentiation of (1).
From (3), it is also easily veri￿ed that
1 ￿ qL
￿0





i + qu00 > 0: (4)






i(w) are strictly increasing in the
date 1 wealth w.
6Insurance against bequest type
An individual who decides to wait until date t = 1 to purchase life insurance
knows that he will purchase either L￿
A(w0) or L￿
B(w0), depending on his
bequest needs. At date t = 0, his expected utility is therefore (1￿￿)VA(w0)+
￿VB(w0). Since V 0
B(w0) > V 0
A(w0), transferring wealth at a fair price from
the low to the high marginal utility state increases expected utility. Put
di⁄erently, the individual would like to insure against the risk of being a
high-bequest type.
Suppose for now, contrary to our earlier assumption, that bequest types
are veri￿able. A contract could then be written at date t = 0 that pays
some amount Q at date t = 1 if the person turns out to be type B. The fair
premium for such a contract is ￿Q paid at date t = 0. The date 1 wealth is
now either wA = w0￿￿Q or wB = w0￿￿Q+Q depending on the individual￿ s
realized bequest type, where (1 ￿ ￿)wA + ￿wB = w0.
It is a simple dynamic programming problem to maximize the expectation
of the value function
max
Q
(1 ￿ ￿)VA(w0 ￿ ￿Q) + ￿VB(w0 ￿ ￿Q + Q):








￿) = 0: (5)
It follows trivially that Q￿ > 0, so that w￿
B > w0 > w￿
A.
The life insurance purchased is then L￿
A(w￿
A) if needs are low and L￿
B(w￿
B)






































i); i = A;B:
7We essentially have a complete contingent claims market and equate marginal
utility in all four possible states of the world. This is achieved by combining
two types of insurance products: one insures against a premature death and
the other insures the uncertain bequest needs. Coverage against the risk of
being the high bequest type, equivalently the transfer of wealth from state
A to state B individuals is w￿
B ￿ w￿
A = Q￿ = q(L￿
B(wB) ￿ L￿
A(wA)), the
di⁄erence in the life insurance premia. We will refer to this set of contracts
as the ￿rst-best solution.
Comparison
It is instructive to compare this ￿rst-best solution with the na￿ve strategy
used when preference risks are not insurable. Using the ￿rst-best strategy,
wealth in the survival state is now equalized across bequest types. Moreover,
because of the wealth transfer and since bequests are normal goods, bequests








the possibility of insuring against preference risks allows the bequest amount
to more closely re￿ ect needs.
Figures 1 and 2 provide a state-space representation of the consumer￿ s
problem at date t = 1, when bequest type is known but one￿ s date of death
is still uncertain. In ￿gure 1 preference risks are not insured. The negatively







Indi⁄erence curves (iso-expected-utility) for both bequest types are shown.
For bequest type i, the marginal rate of substitution between wealth in the






















A, leading to equilibria such as the contingent claims








































d l w w =
B E
A E
Figue 1: Purchase after type is known
Figure 2 illustrates the case where preference risks can be insured. The





i = wi; i = A;B:
The equilibrium contingent claims in this case are E￿
A and E￿
B characterized
by the condition wl￿
B = wl￿
A. Moreover, wd￿
A is smaller and wd￿
B larger than the
corresponding amounts in the uninsured case.
















































Figure 2: First-best insurance
Of course, direct insurance against bequest type is not feasible if one￿ s
bequest type is unveri￿able. An individual purchasing such a policy would
always want to claim that he is the high bequest type in order to receive the
indemnity Q￿. This is obvious from ￿gure 2. Rather than staying at E￿
A,
a type-A individual is better o⁄ claiming he is B and moving to the higher
budget line.
4 Bequest type is unveri￿able
We now turn our attention to the case where bequest type is private infor-
mation and show how we can improve upon the na￿ve strategy of waiting
until date t = 1 to purchase insurance. Note that it does not matter whether
or not type is veri￿able by the insurer to implement the na￿ve strategy.
Long-term life insurance contracts are purchased at date t = 0, before
individuals know their bequest preferences. Many extant life insurance con-
tracts often include provisions that allow for changes to the contract at some
10future date, at the option of the insured. One such type of provision is an
opting out opportunity: the insured can trade-in his policy at a later date
at some pre-speci￿ed buy-back price. Alternatively, the contract can include
an option for the purchase of additional coverage at some pre-speci￿ed rate.
We show that such long-term insurance contracts can improve the individ-
ual￿ s welfare even though bequest types are non-veri￿able. In particular, a
well designed policy allows wealth to e⁄ectively be transferred from type-A
individuals to type-B individuals.
Opting out contracts
We consider a contract with a sell back option. We de￿ne the contract by
the triplet (P;L;K), where P denotes the premium paid at t = 0, L denotes
the death bene￿t and K is the price at which the policy can be traded in
(i.e. sold back to the insurer) at date t = 1. With insurers earning zero
pro￿t, if only type-A individuals sell back their policies, such a contract will
e⁄ectively transfer the amount qL ￿ K from type-A individuals to type-B
individuals at date t = 1. In essence, the insurer sells the original coverage
L at a subsidized price. The insurer ￿nances this subsidy by buying back the
policy at an unfair price from the low-bequest types, who then subsequently
purchase a lower level of coverage.6
Such an arrangement works if the following three incentive-compatibility
conditions are satis￿ed:
(a) type-A individuals choose to sell back their policy at t = 1 and buy a
6As we show below in Proposition 2, the B-type contract provides more insurance than
would be desirable with just a wealth transfer. Thus, the B-types have no desire to
purchase more insurance at date t = 1. Indeed, they would ideally like to purchase less
coverage at date t = 0, but are forced to over-insure in satisfying the constraint (7).
11new short-term policy on the ￿spot￿market at actuarially fair prices7:
VA(w0 ￿ P + K) ￿ qvA(w0 ￿ P + L) + (1 ￿ q)u(w0 ￿ P): (7)
(b) type-B individuals prefer keeping their policy at t = 1:
qvB(w0 ￿ P + L) + (1 ￿ q)u(w0 ￿ P) ￿ VB(w0 ￿ P + K): (8)
(c) From the perspective of date t = 0, the arrangement dominates the
strategy of waiting until t = 1 to buy insurance:
U ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)VA(w0) + ￿VB(w0); (9)
where U denotes the expected utility provided by the long-term contract
U ￿ (1￿￿)VA(w0￿P+K)+￿ [qvB(w0 ￿ P + L) + (1 ￿ q)u(w0 ￿ P)]: (10)
In addition, the contract must yield a non-negative pro￿t:
P ￿ ￿qL + (1 ￿ ￿)K: (11)
It is easily seen that the set of contracts that satisfy the above constraints
is not empty. In particular, consider the contract de￿ned by L = L￿
B(w0) and
P = K = qL￿
B(w0), where L￿
B(w0) is the optimal death bene￿t for type B
under the na￿ve strategy. The non-negative pro￿t condition and (8) are
then satis￿ed as equalities, and (7) is satis￿ed as a strict inequality. Clearly,
this arrangement yields the same outcome as the na￿ve strategy described in
￿gure 1, implying that (9) is then satis￿ed as an equality.
In a competitive market, insurers are led to o⁄er the best contract subject
to pro￿ts being non negative. The equilibrium contract is therefore the one
7We make the usual assumption that an individual chooses the action designed for him
when he is just indi⁄erent between two courses of action.
12that maximizes U de￿ned as in (10) subject to the non-negative pro￿t condi-
tion and the incentive compatibility conditions. Since it is a maximum, the
optimal contract is at least as good as the na￿ve strategy, i.e., the constraint
(9) is trivially satis￿ed. Also, given K ￿ P, it is easily checked that (9)
implies (8). Thus, the only relevant constraints are (7), which is the opting
out condition for type A, and the non-negative pro￿t condition (11).
Second-best arrangement
Under the above arrangement, type A￿ s wealth at date t = 1, after exercising
his option to sell back his policy, is wA = w0 ￿ P + K. This type then
purchases the optimal death bene￿t L￿
A(wA) in the date 1 market. This
yields the ￿nal contingent wealth levels wl





A(wA). Type B does not opt out and thus the ￿nal
contingent wealth allocation follows directly from the long-term insurance
contract, i.e., wl
B = w0 ￿ P and wd




B + (1 ￿ q)w
l
B = w0 ￿ P + qL:
The implied wealth transfer from type-A to type-B individuals is therefore
wB ￿ wA = qL ￿ K.
Written in terms of wA, wl
B and wd






























13The ￿rst inequality is type A￿ s incentive compatibility constraint; the second
follows from the insurer￿ s non-negative pro￿t condition.
It is straightforward to characterize the main features of the solution
to the above problem. The resource constraint (13) is obviously binding.
We show ￿rst that the self-selection condition (12) must be binding as well.
Suppose, to the contrary, that the optimal solution maximizes U subject to



























which corresponds to the ￿rst-best allocation represented in ￿gure 2. How-
ever, as is clear from the ￿gure, type A strictly prefers E￿
B to E￿
A, implying
that type A would not opt out, i.e., (12) is not satis￿ed.
Secondly, the na￿ve strategy is not a solution. As discussed above, (12)
holds as a strict inequality under the na￿ve strategy. Since this condition
must bind, the na￿ve strategy does not solve the problem. However, since
it nevertheless satis￿es the constraints, it must be the case be that the in-
dividual is strictly better o⁄ under the long-term contract. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 Long-term opting-out contracts make individuals strictly bet-
ter o⁄ than the na￿ve strategy, but they remain second-best compared to the
(complete-information) case where bequest needs are directly insurable.
14Levels of coverage
We next examine how the levels of coverage di⁄er under the various insurance
arrangements. The Lagrangian of the second-best program is



























with positive multipliers ￿ and ￿. Together with (12) and (13) holding as
equalities, the solution satis￿es the ￿rst-order conditions
@L
@wA
= (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)V
0




























Denote the solution by (b wA; b wd
B; b wl
B). The date-1 value of type B￿ s allo-
cation is b wB ￿ q b wd
B+(1￿q)b wl
B. Type A￿ s allocation is b wd












An illustration is given in ￿gure 3. We derive two results. First, the wealth
transfer from type-A to type-B individuals in the long-term arrangement is
smaller than in the ￿rst-best contract. Secondly, the second-best contract
provides a greater death bene￿t than type B would wish if he could purchase
















































d l w w =
A E ˆ
B E ˆ
Figure 3: Second-best long term contracts
Wealth transfer. We show that the subsidy from type-A to type-B
individuals is lower in the second-best solution vis-￿-vis the ￿rst-best one:
b wB ￿ b wA < w￿
B ￿ w￿
A. Suppose, to the contrary, that





From the zero-pro￿t condition, the state wealth levels satisfy





Hence, (18) implies b wA ￿ w￿
A and b wB ￿ w￿
B. A￿ s date-1 budget line in the
second-best arrangement is then below the ￿rst-best one represented in ￿gure
2, while B￿ s budget line is above the one in ￿gure 2.
A￿ s allocation satis￿es (17). Since bequest and survival wealth are normal
goods, (18) therefore implies b wl
A ￿ wl￿
A and b wd
A ￿ wd￿
A . Consider now B￿ s
allocation. This is given by the intersection of A￿ s indi⁄erence curve through
(b wd
A; b wl
A) and B￿ s budget line. Obviously, the foregoing implies b wd
B > wd￿
B .


















16where the equality follows from the optimality conditions for a ￿rst best.
We now turn to the restrictions imposed by the ￿rst-order conditions.





















Substituting for V 0
A(b wA) = v0
A(b wd





which contradicts (19). The wealth transfer must therefore be strictly smaller
in the second-best arrangement.
Distortion. Here we show that the B-type is forced to "overinsure,"
which can be interpreted as a type of signalling cost in the second-best set-
ting. This distortion is represented by a point such as b EB in ￿gure 3. As
drawn, the long-term contract provides a larger bequest (and correspondingly
smaller survival wealth) than type B would wish to purchase voluntarily on
the basis of the post-transfer wealth level b wB. In other words, L > L￿
B(b wB)
or equivalently b wd
B > b wB ￿ qL￿
B(b wB) + L￿
B(b wB). This is a necessary feature
of the second-best arrangement. The intuition is that this ￿distortion￿fa-
cilitates the transfer of wealth from state A to state B, by making it more
costly for type A not to opt out of the initial contract.



























B), a contradiction. Moreover, B￿ s indi⁄erence curve
through b EB cannot be steeper than the fair-odds line. Otherwise, a pair
(wd
B;wl
B) could be chosen on the same fair-odds line below A￿ s indi⁄erence
curve through b EB that satis￿es A￿ s incentive compatibility constraint and
is strictly preferred by B. Hence, we must have L larger than L￿
B(b wB) as
claimed.
The next proposition summarizes our results.
17Proposition 2 Under the second-best long-term contract
(i) the wealth transfer between type A and type B is smaller than the ￿rst-best
transfer and
(ii) high-bequest types are over-insured relative to the coverage they would
like to have at the contractually de￿ned wealth level.
The foregoing results imply that type-A￿ s bequest and survival wealth
are greater than in the ￿rst best, while type-B￿ s survival wealth is smaller.
However, how type-B￿ s bequest compares with the ￿rst-best level is ambigu-
ous. There are two opposing e⁄ects so to speak. On the hand, because of the
distortion, B￿ s equilibrium bequest is larger than he would wish at the wealth
level b wB. On the other hand, his wealth level is lower than the ￿rst-best w￿
B.
When conditional wealth levels do not di⁄er too much from the ￿rst best,
it may therefore be that B leaves a larger bequest. In this case, bequest by
both types are greater than in the ￿rst best.
It is interesting to note that at date 1, an individual who turns out to be
type A will be better o⁄with the second-best contract than with the ￿rst-best
one. This is to be expected, since the subsidy is lower under the second-
best arrangement. In other words, at date 0 the individual would prefer
the extra protection a⁄orded by a larger subsidy. However, an individual
who eventually turns out to be of a low-bequest type will be happier if the
subsidy is smaller when date 1 arrives.8
Opting in contracts
An alternative to the opting out arrangement is to o⁄er a contract with an
option to purchase additional coverage at date t = 1. Such an "opt-in"
contract is de￿ned by the vector (P;L;S;k) where P is the premium paid
at t = 0 for coverage L and S is the optional additional coverage that the
8This is an often overlooked artifact of most adverse-selection models.
18individual can purchase at date t = 1 for an additional premium k. If
P > qL and k < qS, then wealth will be transferred from type-A individuals
to type-B individuals, provided of course only type B exercises the option
to purchase additional coverage. Here, the original coverage L is sold at an
unfair premium. The non-negative pro￿t constraint under this opting-in
arrangement is
P ￿ qL + ￿(qS ￿ k): (21)
The above contract is equivalent to selling both types an initial contract
with death bene￿t (L+S) for a premium of (P +k). The type-B individual
"opts in" by maintaining this package at date t = 1. The type-A individual
refuses to "opt in" at date t = 1 by obtaining a refund of the extra premium k,
and reducing the death total bene￿t by an amount S.9 As before, e⁄ectively
only the A-type￿ s incentive compatibility constraint matters, with the type-A
individual being just indi⁄erent between opting in or not opting in.
De￿ning
P ￿ P + k; L ￿ L + S and K ￿ qL + k; (22)
it is easily seen that the non-negative pro￿t constraint (21) is equivalent to the
previous non-negative pro￿t constraint (11), and it will be satis￿ed once again
with an equality at the optimum. We have one additional requirement here,
namely that a type-A individual who would receive a refund qL+k at date t =
1 would purchase an optimal level of insurance coverage L￿
A(w0￿P+qL) = L,
if insurance would be available at a fair price. More formally, from the ￿rst-
order condition for L￿
A, this requires that
v
0





0(w0 ￿ P + qL ￿ qL
￿
A) (23)
9These opting in contracts have the property that the premium loading is collected in
the ￿rst period, which is similar to the types of contracts that one observes for renewable
insurance contracts when there is an insurability risk. Of course, the design in those
models is for quite a di⁄erent purpose; namely, to cope with asymmetry about one￿ s risk
type.
19be satis￿ed when L￿
A(w0 ￿ P + qL) = L.
It then follows in a straightforward manner that the same triple (P;L;K)
is optimal, which together with (22) and (23) determine the parameters for
the optimal opt-in contract: (P;L;S;k). Thus, the opting-in and opting-out
arrangements are e⁄ectively identical.10
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown how a long-term insurance contract can be designed,
within a competitive insurance market, to insure the uncertain future bequest
needs of the individual. We derived two equivalent forms for this long-term
insurance contract:11
(i) It provides a high level of initial coverage at a subsidized (low) price,
with an option to sell back the policy at an unfair price (i.e. at a loss to the
insured)
or
(ii) It provides a low level of initial coverage at an unfair (high) price,
with an option to purchase additional coverage at a subsidized (low) price.
The existence of such contracts in the market place depends crucially
on the self selection of types in exercising the various options. But some
relatively new innovations in the ￿nancial marketplace may have an unto-
ward e⁄ect on the development of the long-term contracts we propose. In
particular, the market for life settlements poses such an obstacle.
10One can also verify this directly by writing out the incentive compatibility constraints
and then ￿nding the optimal (P;L;S;k) directly, which together with (23) shows the
equivalence of the two types of contract arrangements.
11These two forms will not be unique. For example, an intermediate level of insurance
could be o⁄ered with both "opt in" and "opt out" opportunities to achieve the same ￿nal
wealth levels.
20A life settlement contract essentially o⁄ers to "buy back" the life insur-
ance policy of an individual. This is e⁄ected via a third party paying cash to
the insured, in exchange for being named the bene￿ciary of the life insurance
death bene￿t. Although this seems to eliminate any bene￿t to the original
bene￿ciary, this will not be the case. In particular, under contract (i), the
low-bequest need individual will opt to sell the policy to a life settlement
broker, rather than back to the insurer, and receive more money for the pol-
icy. The insured can then purchase insurance at a fair price, since there is
no insurability risk. Under contract (ii), both bequest types might purchase
the additional extra insurance at the low price, with the low-bequest need
type individual then immediately selling back the extra coverage in the life
settlement market for a pro￿t.
The existence of such markets provides an alternative for the insured
that is bene￿cial ex post (i.e., after signing the original long-term contract).
Insurance companies had originally protested as these markets developed,
claiming that they should have the exclusive right to buy-back (i.e. "settle")
contracts that they had written. But others disagree. For example, Do-
herty and Singer (2002) tout the bene￿ts of life settlement markets to the
insurance consumer. Such analysis might be incomplete, however, in that
it excludes the fact that ex ante (i.e. prior to learning one￿ s bequest type)
one would prefer the longer term contracts described in this paper; and the
life settlement market might preclude such contracts from ever being o⁄ered.
Although the long-term contracts we describe in this paper give the insurer
monopoly power ex post, a competitive market ex ante should ensure that
insurers cannot earn undue monopoly rents.
Obviously, we simpli￿ed the setting of our analysis by assuming away
many complicating factors, such as the insurability risk. This allowed our
focus to be on the bequest needs and the (non-random) probability of death.
Integrating these results into more complex settings is di¢ cult. Hopefully,
21our paper takes a good ￿rst step in this direction.
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